At the beginning of May, two summits were held in Armenia: the first, the European Political Summit, and immediately afterwards the first ever summit between Armenia and the European Union. The events recalled Emmanuel Macron running with stray dogs, as well as how he did it rich A song by Charles Aznavour, accompanied by Nikol Pashinyan on drums. And of course, the words of Vladimir Zelensky, which sparked “discontent” in the Russian Foreign Ministry. However, in reality, the summits were primarily important for Armenia itself, where parliamentary elections will be held in early June. For Meduza in particular, political scientist and researcher at the Latvian Foreign Policy Institute Sergei Potapkin explains why EU leaders are coming to Armenia.
Armenia approaches the June elections not in a state of pre-election mobilization, but in a state of political fatigue. After the war, the loss of Karabakh and several years of continuous crises, the country enters the election campaign with an overloaded political field: the Central Election Commission registered 19 political forces, but this number speaks more about fragmentation than a real wealth of choice.
In this atmosphere, not the least thing that influences the Armenian voter’s choice is the parties’ position on foreign policy issues. That is why the first-ever bilateral summit between the EU and Armenia and the European Political Community summit, which took place in Yerevan from May 4 to 5, falls outside the scope of diplomatic protocol and falls within the scope of elections.
In mid-2010, Russia remained in the public consciousness as the main friend and defender of Armenia. But after the 2020 war, and especially after the loss of Karabakh in 2023, the situation towards Moscow worsened sharply. in Opinion polls In 2021, France was already ahead of Russia as Armenia’s “main friend” – 36 versus 35%.
By 2026, the issue of relations with Russia returned not as a dispute over the previous alliance, but as part of an atmosphere of geopolitical loss. This is also notable because foreign policy in Armenia has become internal again: security and borders remain the main issues for a significant part of the participants, and any escalation around Iran, Baku or Ankara immediately falls into the center of public attention.
In such an environment, the summits held in May in Yerevan are of great importance as a political signal in the first place. The fact that dozens of European leaders arrived in the Armenian capital almost simultaneously, and the next day – President of the European Council Antonio Costa and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, excited many people in Yerevan. tangible As an explanatory support for Nikol Pashinyan before the elections.
The timing also contributed to this: the European meetings were held a few days before the start of the official campaign: the official campaign period begins three days after it ends. And also about a month after the public skirmishes between Pashinyan and Vladimir Putin in Moscow in April.
However, Europe brought to Yerevan more than just symbols. Following the EU-Armenia summit, the parties announced the expansion of cooperation in the fields of energy, transportation and digital technologies, and also emphasized that investments in this framework could reach 2.5 billion euros. In the final match a permit Support for Armenia’s sovereignty, sustainability and reforms, as well as strengthening cooperation in the areas of security, justice and border management are recorded separately.
But at the same time, the limits of European generosity were also being defined. The matter that had the strongest emotional impact on the Armenian voter – the clear promise of the visa exemption system – was not expressed at the summit. The documents document “significant progress” in the dialogue and the need to implement the action plan, but there is no political decision on visa-free travel. Europe gave Pashinyan structure, money, and recognition, but it did not deliver the most winning electoral promise.
Russian propagandists began enthusiastically discussing the results of past summits. NTV reported that the Europeans “fed Pashinyan with empty promises,” Channel One accused him of trying to “sit on two chairs,” and REN TV described the summit as an event “under the anti-Russian flag.”
For the Kremlin, the torment of the Armenian elections lies in the fact that the Armenian Prime Minister was convenient for a long time: it was possible to negotiate with him, and at a certain period he was one of the most compatible foreign leaders with Putin, perhaps second in this indicator, after Alexander Lukashenko. In the absence of a truly strong opposition within Armenia, overt attempts to remove him could seriously damage this form of relationship that is convenient for Moscow.
But after US mediation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, the launch of Trump’s path, and Yerevan’s general shift to a more diversified foreign policy, Armenia has an alternative. Now the country’s strategy is not limited to achieving a balance between Moscow and the West, but rather leads to the complete removal of Russia from the role of arbiter and guarantor in the South Caucasus.
The April meeting between Pashinyan and Putin appeared to be an attempt by the latter to determine the limits of permitted maneuvering for Yerevan. Putin has publicly pointed to cheap gas, the incompatibility between deep integration with the European Union and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, and made clear that he would like to see the full range of pro-Russian forces in the elections, in an apparent reference to Samvel’s Strong Armenia party. It is often seen as a suitable new project for Moscow.
Against this background, the European presence in Yerevan no longer looks like neutral diplomacy, but rather as a counter-signal. It tells the Armenian voter that in addition to Moscow, Armenia has external partners willing to work with it as an independent player, regardless of Russia’s role in the region.
This is important in itself for a part of society. After 2020 and 2023, distrust of any security guarantees has accumulated in Armenia, but the demand for foreign relations that are not limited to Russian tutelage has also grown significantly. In this sense, the EU-Armenia summit turned out to be more beneficial for Pashinyan, not even as a source of money, but as a visual confirmation that the path towards Europe is not empty rhetoric.
However, there is something else that is no less important: Europe has shown the limits of its openness. It is ready to invest, help with reforms and talk about partnership and sustainability, but it is not ready to make political decisions on the same principle that depends on the status of the candidate countries. receive Moldova and Georgia.
The European summits will not decide the outcome of the elections for Pashinyan. Moreover, they once again unnerved the Kremlin, and perhaps rallied it, reminding that the struggle for Armenia was no longer continuing in bilateral form, and there was only a month left to take retaliatory steps to impose the partnership.
The threat of losing the common market and cheap energy resources will still influence the choice of some Armenian voters, many of whom do not believe in rapprochement with the West and alternative security guarantees, even if only because of the remoteness of the border. In any case, it has now finally become clear that the upcoming elections are not only about the composition of the future parliament, but also about who will be the main partner of Armenia and how it will live in principle further.
Sergey Potapkin