Despite strong pressure from Russia, Nikol Pashinyan won parliamentary elections in Armenia – and the country made a clear choice in favor of the West, not in favor of the Russian Federation. However, the scale of Russia’s failure should not be exaggerated. Pro-Russian parties still achieved their best result since 2018, and the Armenian Prime Minister after his victory here Putin on Russia’s Day maleShe will soon go to visit him. What will happen next in relations between Russia and Armenia? On this question in condition Freelance journalist Alexander Atasuntsev responds to the Carnegie Politika project. Medusa publishes this text in full.
Why were Moscow’s threats necessary?
Russia’s pressure on Armenia before the elections had at least two goals. First, with the help of the ban on various types of Armenian imports, Moscow wanted to intimidate Armenian voters with the negative consequences of losing the Russian market and thus strengthen the positions of pro-Russian parties. It is no coincidence that the import restrictions primarily affected products of Armenian agriculture – they were supposed to hit voters from the districts in question, among whom Pashinyan is more popular than city residents. In the capital, the Prime Minister’s party received just over 40%, while in the regions – less than 60%.
Russia’s second goal was to influence Pashinyan directly, and this in the long term. In this pile you can put threats to denounce the gas agreement if Armenia continues with European integration, as well as a joint statement of the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union () demanding a referendum in Armenia for or against joining the European Union.
In light of the collective nature of the latter demand, Moscow has sought to portray that it is more interested in economics than politics, and that it is not only Moscow that is demanding that Yerevan make a decision, but rather the rest of the members of the Eurasian Economic Union, where key decisions are formally made by consensus. In addition, the referendum discussion, according to the Kremlin’s plan, was aimed at exposing Pashinyan’s rhetoric on European integration as a malignant act, when voters are deceived by vague promises about benefits, without mentioning the risks and costs.
Even in Moldova, which is much closer to Europe, a year and a half ago, the margin in favor of the EU in such a referendum was very small, so the Kremlin had every reason to hope that the vote in Armenia would fail completely.
Why isn’t Armenia particularly afraid?
However, despite the threatening noise with which Moscow introduced the embargo and put forward demands against Armenia, the actually adopted restrictions do not yet promise major losses for Yerevan. It is sensitive to certain industries, such as the flower industry, or vegetables and fruits, where almost all foreign supplies go to the Russian market. But in general, all goods prohibited for import represent only a few percent of Armenian exports, and even this small percentage refers only to individual producers of cognac or, for example, apricots, whose season has not yet begun.
Of course, Moscow can continue to increase pressure after the elections – and there are enough tools for this. But it’s not entirely clear what this will give her. Moreover, Armenia, despite all the disparity in relations, has something that can respond to the escalation.
Growing pressures would push Yerevan not only toward the European Union, but also toward Türkiye, which is increasingly competing with Russia for influence in the South Caucasus. In early June, as Moscow bombarded Armenia with embargoes and threats, Pashinyan called not only his EU allies but also Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They discussed launching direct trade, and it is expected that the borders will open after the signing of the peace treaty with Baku.
Russia also receives direct benefits from economic cooperation with Armenia. For example, since 2022, the Caucasian country has become a shipping point for sanctioned Western goods, which the Russian economy desperately needs.
Compared to pre-war 2021, Armenian exports to Russia by the end of 2025 have almost quadrupled – from $840 million to nearly $3 billion. The growth occurred primarily due to the re-export of Western goods. For example, in 2025, Armenia sent almost $1 billion worth of electronics to Russia, compared to $12 million in 2021.
Yerevan also has high-level political measures in its arsenal. For example, Pashinyan could announce his withdrawal from the CSTO. In the pre-election discussions, he also touched on this topic. Moreover, Armenia has not received any benefits from its presence in it for a long time – practically Russia to stop Selling weapons to Armenia for several years.
Western sanctions have made Armenia a valuable partner for Russian companies in other areas as well. For example, in 2024 this will be actively done Re-exported Billions of dollars in gold. The scheme was closed after it became known. Things are also going well in the banking sector. If funds from Russia do not reach beneficiaries through Armenian banks, imports through Armenia will not be actively used.
What’s next?
After the elections, there is no longer any point for Russia to even adhere to the restrictions already imposed on Armenia. Over a long distance, they do more harm than good. Even after a few weeks of operation, the effect was negative. The European Union said it would provide financial assistance to Yerevan and temporarily lift import duties on Armenian fruits and vegetables. Several European countries organized a show of solidarity, pledging their trade platforms for Armenian goods. In formal terms, all this seemed much better than Moscow’s threats, and could only increase the popularity of the pro-European path.
In addition, after the elections, the Kremlin gained other levers of influence over Yerevan. Following the results of the vote, the pro-Russian opposition in the Armenian parliament strengthened significantly. For the first time since he came to power in 2018, Pashinyan’s party will not have a constitutional party.
This is especially important now, because without opposition votes, the Armenian government will not be able to call a referendum on changing the constitution, and this is the last obstacle to achieving peace with Azerbaijan. Baku demands that the reference to the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, which is based on the resolution on the reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh, be removed from the preamble of the document. If Baku continues to insist, Pashinyan will have to negotiate with the pro-Russian opposition, over which Moscow has great influence.
Pashinyan himself is aware of the need to reduce tension in relations with Russia – and it is no coincidence that on the eve of the elections he announced this. maleThat immediately after his re-election he will go to Moscow: “We will meet and resolve all current issues.”
It seems that he will be accepted into the Kremlin willingly. Despite all the threatening rhetoric, the Armenian Prime Minister remains a leader with whom Vladimir Putin is willing to reach out. Not as an ally, but as a partner, even if that is problematic.
The Russian leadership has not yet placed Pashinyan among the most hated category of politicians such as Mikheil Saakashvili, Vladimir Zelensky, or Maia Sandu. Only in 2025 did the Armenian Prime Minister meet with Putin in person twice and again in 2026, during a working visit to the Kremlin.
Pashinyan is also personally present at the activities of the Eurasian Economic Union, with the exception of the recent summit in Astana, where his absence was due to the elections. And if he had serious conflicts with someone in the organization, then with the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko because of him Data About the war in Karabakh.
Now re-elected Pashinyan will travel to Russia, and the Kremlin will be able to ask him for something. In the past, Moscow has restricted imports from Armenia more than once – for example, difficulties with cognac have already arisen in 2023 and 2024. But then the restrictions were lifted.
This does not mean that conflicts will disappear from Armenia’s relations with Moscow, as the country’s drift towards the West already appears to be irreversible. according to May poll International Republican Institute, 75% of Armenians support European integration. But for now, the majority also believes that Yerevan should not develop relations with Brussels at the expense of its partnership with Russia, which makes easing tensions attractive for both sides.