On June 16 and 18, Ukrainian drones penetrated the defenses in southeastern Moscow and the two main oil processing units of the Moscow refinery. The second time, several fuel containers burned there; Smoke resulting from the fire covered the surrounding residential areas. The Ukrainian Armed Forces combined several targets in this strike: it lasted campaign Strikes on oil refineries; It showed that they are capable of penetrating the strongest air defense areas in Russia. Finally, we got an amazing media photo Proven Allies in the West. For Russian officials and military personnel, this image is also indicative: it is clear that the air defense system, even in the capital area, cannot stop large-scale attacks. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have learned to gather the necessary forces to “overload” radars and missile launchers around the most protected objects. Other protection plans are in use to a limited extent or are in the testing phase.
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How did Ukrainian drones learn to penetrate Moscow’s air defense? What is the damage caused by the recent strikes?
In the spring of 2026, Ukraine made successive attacks on Russian oil refining facilities a priority target of its air campaign. The choice is not accidental:
- The Ukrainian Armed Forces and the country’s special services have one long-range weapon in sufficient quantities. These are drones of various models with relatively weak warheads weighing several tens of kilograms. As a rule, these drones, which strike targets at a distance of more than 500 kilometers, have warheads half as powerful as those of the latest Russian Geraniums. Ukraine does not yet have enough missiles (cruise and ballistic) to conduct a large-scale air campaign.
- It is difficult, for example, to destroy reinforced concrete buildings of factories of the military-industrial complex or large bridges with warheads weighing several tens of kilograms. Therefore, it makes sense to strike unprotected targets in open areas. Naturally, these goals should be of high value for the Russian economy. Refineries located in the European part of Russia ideally fit these criteria.
- The previous Ukrainian campaign against oil refining in the fall of 2025 showed that systematic measures were needed to achieve maximum damage. With rare attacks on refineries’ most vulnerable large primary processing units (AVT – atmospheric vacuum tubes), Russia was able to restore production relatively quickly. In the spring and summer of 2026, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are striking more frequently, and the strikes themselves are becoming more diverse. In addition to motor vehicles and fuel tanks, advanced processing units that are difficult to repair (and require imported spare parts) are also affected. It all depends Data Bloomberg led to a decline in gasoline production by 13% on an annual basis at the end of last May Close to the thresholdAfter that, the country will suffer from fuel shortages. Since then, attacks on refineries have continued, although repairs to the damaged plants are continuing.
- Until recently, Gazprom Neft’s Moscow refinery suffered relatively little from Ukrainian attacks — it had individual attacks with long intervals between them. This is due to the fact that the plant is located within a strong air defense emplacement area, and also has its own on-site air defense (i.e. self-defence) systems – obviously more numerous than most other companies.
- Oddly enough, the difficulties in penetrating such air defenses lead not only to technical problems, but also to political advantages for Ukraine: if the Ukrainian armed forces began to regularly overcome massive defenses, this would demonstrate (to Ukrainian and Russian society, as well as to the West) the weakness of the Kremlin.
The June 18 hack appears to have involved a large force of drones. The Russian Ministry of Defense describes this as a record, indicating that nearly a thousand drones were shot down (but there is no confidence in these statements).
We can definitely say that the raid was unusual.
- Not only the traditional long-range UAVs FP-1 and “Fierce” have been widely used, but also other systems. For exampleis made according to the same aerodynamic design of the Sichen drone as the Russian Geran drone.
- In addition, the raid set a record for the number of drone strikes recorded on video (which is likely explained not only by the scale of the attack, but also by the fact that the air battle in the refinery area took place in broad daylight in a densely populated area).
- The video also included several mistakes made by the interceptors of the Russian anti-aircraft missile systems that were defending the factory.
- There is not a single video in which a drone was definitely shot down by a weapon other than interceptor missiles.
One way or another, the Ukrainian armed forces struck several facilities and fuel tanks at the refinery. Drones also fell on the grounds of the nearby Sadovod market. Others ended up in high-rise buildings and construction sites in nearby residential areas. The last fact indicates that when preparing the flight mission, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could not use modern satellite images of the area, but old digital maps, which are not marked on new houses and construction cranes.
The exact damage to the refinery is still unknown. Reuters wrote that one of two AVT units (with a primary processing capacity of six million tons of oil per year) was damaged on June 16 and was scheduled to be restored this week. But the strike on June 18 hit the second unit and other facilities and pipelines at the enterprise. The plant has probably stopped processing completely, at least for a few days. Its further fate depends on how systematic the attacks of the Ukrainian armed forces are.
So why did the air defense stop confronting Ukrainian attacks?
Russia faced massive drone attacks later from Ukraine, which it has not yet encountered Built-in Air defense systems to counter them.
- There is no drone detection system that covers all border areas, especially the interior of the country. At the same time, Ukraine has created a complex of detection means, consisting of: 1) reconnaissance means that warn of launches; 2) radar networks capable of tracking low-speed, low-flying targets; 3) Acoustic sensor networks that detect drones through engine sound.
- Russia also does not have a system for automatic exchange of information between various sensors and drone weapons.
- There is a lack of specialized means to destroy drones. The defense system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces includes both aviation (airplanes of various types and helicopters that can be quickly moved into the flight path of a group of drones) and mobile fire groups, including interceptor drones armed with automatic sighting elements. These kits cover drone flight directions and object protection. It is worth noting that a significant part of the equipment (for example, many radars) is supplied to Ukraine by the West. But such a defense is not entirely effective. Outside the Kiev region, drone attacks alone (even without combining them with various missile strikes) still pose a serious threat.
- The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are largely dependent on the defense of the site, which is easy to “overload” with a large number of targets. At the same time, the basis of this defense is anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), the number of which (as well as production) is limited. The air defense system is designed to repel air strikes and a small number of cruise missiles. The appearance of dozens of low-flying drones in its area of responsibility (often without warning from the command) further complicates the fight against attacks.
- Russian aviation is participating in repelling the attacks, but it is clear that the funds collected are not enough. There are not enough mobile fire groups yet, and their weapons (mainly machine guns with special sights and portable air defense systems) are not very effective against drones. Russian interceptor aircraft (mainly Elka systems) are deployed on the front, fighting small and medium-sized drones. It does not carry warheads and is therefore hardly suitable for destroying large drones weighing hundreds of kilograms.
The Russian army is working on developing other protection methods and plans, but most of them are still in the testing stage. Thus, several types of automatic weapons equipped with rapid-fire cannons are being studied, including those with radio-fuse projectiles, capable of hitting UAVs with a close-in blast rather than a direct hit. Portable radars for detecting drones are also being produced, but there are clearly not enough of them even at the forefront.
Creating an integrated system for these weapons could take several months. During this period, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could increase production of drones and acquire other weapons of mass destruction at their disposal.
“Analysis” section